> Was CC and KC both performed on the Pi?
> Was CC and KC both performed on the Pi? That introduces side channel attacks. I specifically said the RPi does nothing else but CC. > Does CC include implementation flaws enabling remote access? An attacker may use the Pi to enhance attacks against the system executing KC. > Does the Pi include any remotely exploitable flaws? See before. The interface from the PC to the RPi should of course have the same security as any internet-facing interface. Thus the remote access to the RPi wouldn't pose a risk for using the protocol beside the obvious risks that you always get in such a scenario. > Systems which rely upon cipher-obscurity are not secure. Most amateur cryptosystems are trivially defeated without any knowledge of their internals (FBI has some nice articles on cryptanalysis of criminal ciphers). Advising amateurs to rely upon homegrown ciphers is unprofessional and encourages bad risk mitigation strategies. The system I described is not trivially defeated because defeating it implies defeating KC. Did you read my comments? > We also disagree about the difficulty of breaking non-keyed bijections (trivial) versus AES-at-scale ("not trivial"). The cost of the latter easily exceeds $1B. The former would take a trained cryptanalyst less than a month. Is your data worth <$10,000? To break my cipher an attacker would need to solve _both_ problems. My point is that _if_ AES is broken without our knowledge, using the system I described can still make untargeted-surveillance impractical. Isn't that an interesting property for a protocol using a custom cipher?
Posted by madez on Apr 14, 2015, 6:47 PM
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Raise real-world problems, find people facing the same issue, and discuss solutions.7,000 issues0 comments
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Yeah PC was a horrible platform before Win2k, but there was a beautiful short time period when we had alternatives like Amiga, Atari, NeX...
Living in a 200+ year old house, I've seen a lot of this first-hand through both planned and unplanned renovations and repairs.
Is anything with the pebble time able to capture heart rate for historical data analysis?
Datastar has evolved into a suite of tools [1].
> real issue is that MSG is basically a public utility.
Everything good is a slippery slope: every step in the right direction is bad if you overshoot.
Status Update - May 2026
I think what you wrote makes sense, and you missed one critical aspect : shared access to excessively expensive capitalized facilities an...
> Was CC and KC both performed on the Pi?
> Was CC and KC both performed on the Pi? That introduces side channel attacks. I specifically said the RPi does nothing else but CC. > Does CC include implementation flaws enabling remote access? An attacker may use the Pi to enhance attacks against the system executing KC. > Does the Pi include any remotely exploitable flaws? See before. The interface from the PC to the RPi should of course have the same security as any internet-facing interface. Thus the remote access to the RPi wouldn't pose a risk for using the protocol beside the obvious risks that you always get in such a scenario. > Systems which rely upon cipher-obscurity are not secure. Most amateur cryptosystems are trivially defeated without any knowledge of their internals (FBI has some nice articles on cryptanalysis of criminal ciphers). Advising amateurs to rely upon homegrown ciphers is unprofessional and encourages bad risk mitigation strategies. The system I described is not trivially defeated because defeating it implies defeating KC. Did you read my comments? > We also disagree about the difficulty of breaking non-keyed bijections (trivial) versus AES-at-scale ("not trivial"). The cost of the latter easily exceeds $1B. The former would take a trained cryptanalyst less than a month. Is your data worth <$10,000? To break my cipher an attacker would need to solve _both_ problems. My point is that _if_ AES is broken without our knowledge, using the system I described can still make untargeted-surveillance impractical. Isn't that an interesting property for a protocol using a custom cipher?
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