Results are currently mixed: ask Google.
Results are currently mixed: ask Google. More work needed on UDP flow-control versus state-of-the-art TCP, and it seems to suffer badly on some ISPs without any clear clue why (probably anti-P2P throttling, is my guess?). Might end up influencing a future DTLS, but there's no roadmap that far ahead and the WG isn't chartered to discuss overhauls or big changes, according to the chairs: if we need a TLS 2.0, we're probably going to need a tls-ng Working Group with a more open-ended remit. We're doing our best to get rid of the worst baggage from TLS 1.3: only forward-secure ciphersuites using AEADs (AES-GCM, ChaCha20-Poly1305 which is in CFRG consensus call now, etc), a... lively discussion about renegotiation, client authentication, key rollovers and plain DHE given the "triple handshake" vuln... a better PRF and handshake, maybe (Triple-DH?)? Still in progress. It's mostly going to be a big tidy-up I reckon, much like LibReSSL is for OpenSSL! Curve25519 for ECDHE has a draft and is being discussed right now. I'm ready to implement and looking forward to it - big speed boost! PKIX lags behind, however, and is one of the more dangerous parts to implement (ASN.1 and friends). Certificate handling is a real bitch to get perfect, and there's a lot of inertia: Ed25519 would be wonderful, but even ECDSA certs are rare as hen's teeth right now (not that I'm a fan of ECDSA as it's a nightmare to get right - see recent BoringSSL patches). A wholesale replacement is unfortunately way out of scope: too much baggage.
Posted by AlyssaRowan on Jun 27, 2014, 1:00 PM
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- Not sure what you suggest to do.
- Why is this not yet published on the official website and why is there no CVE?
- The biggest problem with having an LLM do this, from what I've observed of at least frontier models, is that the way they are trained...
- The biggest problem with MOND is that it was hand-crafted with additional parameters simply to fit the data.
- (My comment is about detached houses).
- The biggest problem with this is that I can't run my company's own internal benchmarks against this API, because they will be trained int...
Raise real-world problems, find people facing the same issue, and discuss solutions.9,500 issues0 comments
hackernews (Other)
Not sure what you suggest to do.
NewWhy is this not yet published on the official website and why is there no CVE?
NewThe biggest problem with having an LLM do this, from what I've observed of at least frontier models, is that the way they are trained...
The biggest problem with MOND is that it was hand-crafted with additional parameters simply to fit the data.
(My comment is about detached houses).
The biggest problem with this is that I can't run my company's own internal benchmarks against this API, because they will be trained int...
> steer Claude away from over-engineering parts of the system in response to hypothetical concerns.
Why is there no comparison with FLUX 3 Image?
Results are currently mixed: ask Google.
Results are currently mixed: ask Google. More work needed on UDP flow-control versus state-of-the-art TCP, and it seems to suffer badly on some ISPs without any clear clue why (probably anti-P2P throttling, is my guess?). Might end up influencing a future DTLS, but there's no roadmap that far ahead and the WG isn't chartered to discuss overhauls or big changes, according to the chairs: if we need a TLS 2.0, we're probably going to need a tls-ng Working Group with a more open-ended remit. We're doing our best to get rid of the worst baggage from TLS 1.3: only forward-secure ciphersuites using AEADs (AES-GCM, ChaCha20-Poly1305 which is in CFRG consensus call now, etc), a... lively discussion about renegotiation, client authentication, key rollovers and plain DHE given the "triple handshake" vuln... a better PRF and handshake, maybe (Triple-DH?)? Still in progress. It's mostly going to be a big tidy-up I reckon, much like LibReSSL is for OpenSSL! Curve25519 for ECDHE has a draft and is being discussed right now. I'm ready to implement and looking forward to it - big speed boost! PKIX lags behind, however, and is one of the more dangerous parts to implement (ASN.1 and friends). Certificate handling is a real bitch to get perfect, and there's a lot of inertia: Ed25519 would be wonderful, but even ECDSA certs are rare as hen's teeth right now (not that I'm a fan of ECDSA as it's a nightmare to get right - see recent BoringSSL patches). A wholesale replacement is unfortunately way out of scope: too much baggage.
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