It is conceivable, with the right tradeoffs, that computing individual discrete logs over a few popular 1024-bit moduli could be made cheap.
It is conceivable, with the right tradeoffs, that computing individual discrete logs over a few popular 1024-bit moduli could be made cheap. However, none of the available evidence suggests this practice. There is a lot of inconsistent thinking behind the advice given in the article: - Hard-to-implement NIST curves suck, whereas GCM and Poly1305 are recommended. - NIST apparently sucks, but NSA-designed SHA-2 is recommended. - MACs need 256-bit tags, so UMAC and not-NSA-designed RIPEMD160 is apparently not fine, but GCM/Poly1305's 128-bit tags are recommended. On this note, 256-bit tags are pointless when the rest of the crypto infrastructure is sitting on 128-bit security. - 3DES is not recommended because DES is 'broken', not realizing that this break is due to small key length of the original DES; 3DES is deemed to be quite secure (but slow ). - 64-bit block size is enforced, but for no good reason: SSH's 32-bit sequence number, along with counter mode, renders block size worries moot.
Posted by pbsd on Jan 6, 2015, 3:04 PM
Tags
Related issues
- I hate that folks recommend random extensions.
- This is my biggest problem with agents, they constantly defensively code for cases that have no chance of happening and in most cases a p...
- I wish there was something like LEAN for biology.
- The issue is really the extreme difficulty of programming them, especially for anything sequential (rather than combinatorial).
- I probably could have beared with it if it was only limited to programming, but it showing up in creative fields has made me feel all sor...
- I hate that I'm in deep enough to know what you mean.
Raise real-world problems, find people facing the same issue, and discuss solutions.9,000 issues0 comments
reliability (Other)
I hate that folks recommend random extensions.
NewThis is my biggest problem with agents, they constantly defensively code for cases that have no chance of happening and in most cases a p...
I wish there was something like LEAN for biology.
The issue is really the extreme difficulty of programming them, especially for anything sequential (rather than combinatorial).
I probably could have beared with it if it was only limited to programming, but it showing up in creative fields has made me feel all sor...
I hate that I'm in deep enough to know what you mean.
The biggest problem with “AI” is that big corps are shoving it down our throats.
in the middel of a coding session with 5.6 sol.
It is conceivable, with the right tradeoffs, that computing individual discrete logs over a few popular 1024-bit moduli could be made cheap.
It is conceivable, with the right tradeoffs, that computing individual discrete logs over a few popular 1024-bit moduli could be made cheap. However, none of the available evidence suggests this practice. There is a lot of inconsistent thinking behind the advice given in the article: - Hard-to-implement NIST curves suck, whereas GCM and Poly1305 are recommended. - NIST apparently sucks, but NSA-designed SHA-2 is recommended. - MACs need 256-bit tags, so UMAC and not-NSA-designed RIPEMD160 is apparently not fine, but GCM/Poly1305's 128-bit tags are recommended. On this note, 256-bit tags are pointless when the rest of the crypto infrastructure is sitting on 128-bit security. - 3DES is not recommended because DES is 'broken', not realizing that this break is due to small key length of the original DES; 3DES is deemed to be quite secure (but slow ). - 64-bit block size is enforced, but for no good reason: SSH's 32-bit sequence number, along with counter mode, renders block size worries moot.
Comments (0)
No comments yet. Start the discussion.